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Lagged effectsIt has been suggested that carbon labelling of food, on voluntary or non-voluntary basis, could reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases. However, there is limited empirical evidence on the influence of such
labels on consumer purchases. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether voluntary carbon
labelling affects the demand for milk. A randomized field experiment was conducted in 17 retail stores
in Sweden, where a sign provided consumers with qualitative information about the carbon impact of
climate-certified milk. The results suggest that the sign increased the demand for the climate-certified
milk by approximately 6–8%, and the result is robust to alternative model specifications. The effect is
entirely driven by large stores, such as supermarkets. We find no statistically significant impact on total
milk sales, and the dataset is too small to verify the consequences for other milk brands. The effect on the
demand for the labelled milk is short-lived.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Food consumption accounts for a large proportion of the global
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Steinfeld et al., 2006). In Europe,
nearly one-third of the consumption-based GHG emissions origi-
nate from the food sector (Tukker et al., 2006). Current trends point
towards increased demand for food with large environmental
impacts, but changed consumption patterns can lower GHG
emissions substantially (Carlsson-Kanyama and González, 2009;
Carlsson-Kanyama and Lindén, 2001; Duchin, 2005; Weber and
Matthews, 2008).
Carbon labelling of consumer products could potentially reduce
GHG emissions (Dietz et al., 2009; Vandenbergh et al., 2011).
Successful voluntary labelling schemes might relieve the pressure
on governments to introduce more stringent policy instruments,
such as environmental regulation and carbon taxation, which
could meet substantial resistance from different interest groups
due to the associated private costs. Private and public actors seem
highly aware of the potential gains of carbon labelling. In a survey
of 544 eco-labelling schemes across the world, Gruère (2015) finds
that the number of carbon labelling schemes has grown rapidlysince 1990, compared to labelling schemes with other environ-
mental focus, and currently constitute more than one-tenth of all
eco-labelling schemes.
The ability of carbon labels to significantly reduce carbon emis-
sions ultimately depends on consumer response to labelling. The
central question is whether labelling leads to increased consump-
tion of goods with small carbon emissions at the expense of goods
with large emissions. Studies show that the impact of eco-labelling
is determined by several factors such as label design, the type of
product labelled, and how and where the product is marketed
(Cohen and Vandenbergh, 2012; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2012;
Hallstein and Villas-Boas, 2013; Onozaka et al., 2010; Vlaeminck
et al., 2014). These factors are typically affected by whether the
labelling system is voluntary or mandatory, and private or public
(Cohen and Vandenbergh, 2012; Sedjo and Swallow, 2002).
The purpose of this paper is to investigate if an in-store infor-
mation sign on a voluntary carbon labelling scheme has the poten-
tial to alter consumer demand for climate-friendly milk in the
short run. A randomized controlled field trial (RCT) is carried out
in 17 grocery stores around the city of Uppsala in Sweden. The trial
allows for isolation of the effect of carbon information on consump-
tion (rather than the effect of advertising low-carbon foods)
and thereby provides an estimate of the impact of carbon labelling
on consumer demand for milk. We investigate the direct effect
on climate-certified milk, substitution effects on other milk
products, and the dynamic effects across time. Causal parameter
estimates suggest that in-store information increased sales of the
3 From one or both of the Swedish third-party monitored labelling organizations
Svenskt Sigill (Swedish Seal) and KRAV.
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larger stores, which means that the overall market impact is closer
to the upper bound. We find no lagged effects of labelling. The
increase in the sales of climate-certified milk is likely to be
compensated for by reductions in the sales of either other milk
brands or other products, but the dataset is too small to verify
the substitution patterns.
A growing number of studies use field experiments to identify
the impact of eco-labelling on demand for consumer products.
Some of these studies carry out RCTs across multiple stores. For
example, Hainmueller et al. (2015) derive the impact of a Fair
Trade label on demand for coffee, showing that sales rose by 10%
when coffee was labelled as Fair Trade, and Hainmueller and
Hiscox (2012) investigate the response to an environmental label
on jeans, showing that purchases by female shoppers in retail
stores increased by 8%. Other studies carry out experiments in a
single grocery store. For example, Vanclay et al. (2011) labelled
37 different products to indicate embodied GHG emission using a
traffic light colour system and showed that sales of the least carbon
intensive products increased by 4%, whereas sales of the most
carbon intensive products fell. A few studies apply quasi-
experimental approaches using data from multiple stores.
Hallstein and Villas-Boas (2013) analyse demand response to the
introduction of a traffic-colour sustainable sea-food advisory label,
which was first introduced in two randomly chosen stores and
then fully implemented in all ten stores belonging to a supermar-
ket retail chain. The results show that consumers reduced their
overall purchases of seafood through a reduction in demand for
the yellow-labelled category. Kortelainen et al. (2013) apply a
quasi-experimental approach to market data with an aim of quan-
tifying the price-premium on carbon-labelled detergents but find
no evidence of such a premium. Other in-store experiments
involve recruitment of participants among store customers, such
as Vlaeminck et al. (2014), where it is shown that a colour scale
label, which indicates multiple sustainability attributes, signifi-
cantly raised purchases of the most sustainable products. Finally,
Koppel and Schulze (2013) recruited participants in cafés at
German universities and asked them to choose between buying
Fair Trade coffee and giving a direct donation to the aims of the Fair
Trade mark. Their results indicate that the product’s public good
attributes were more important for the willingness to pay a pre-
mium for Fair Trade coffee compared to its private good attributes.
A small number of studies have investigated consumers’ stated
preferences for carbon-labelled food products. The results in
Echeverría et al. (2014) show that consumers are willing to pay
29% more for fluid milk and 10% more for bread that is provided
with a carbon footprint label. Comparing willingness-to-pay for
different labels, Caputo et al. (2013) conclude that consumers’ pre-
fer a CO2-label to a food-miles-label on tomatoes, and Van Loo et al.
(2014) show that consumers are willing to pay more for a free
range or animal welfare label on chicken compared to a carbon
footprint or organic label.
Several studies investigate revealed preferences for eco-labels
on food using hedonic price models and either scanner data or data
collected in food stores. There appears to be no applications to
carbon-labelled food, but the most relevant articles analyse organic
labelling, showing a substantial price premium on milk, fresh fruit,
vegetables, and jarred baby food (Kiesel and Villas-Boas, 2007; Lin
et al., 2008; Maguire et al., 2004). Real market data are also used to
identify the impact of the dolphin-safe tuna label (Teisl et al., 2002)
and the Nordic Swan label (Bjørner et al., 2004), where the latter is
used on non-food everyday commodities.
Given our interest in actual consumer behaviour, we follow
Hainmueller et al. (2015) and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2012) by
carrying out an RCT on a sample of multiple stores to identify
the impact of a food carbon label. When compared to studies thatmake use of a single time series of scanner data (e.g., Bjørner et al.,
2004; Teisl et al., 2002) or use a quasi-experimental approach
(Hallstein and Villas-Boas, 2013; Kortelainen et al., 2013), the
randomized assignment of treatments across both weeks and
stores allows us to estimate causal effects of labelling without
control variables. Similar to Hainmueller et al. (2015),
Hainmueller and Hiscox (2012), and most of the stated and
revealed preference studies mentioned above, we analyse the sub-
stitution between products that are provided with an eco-label and
close substitutes that are not. Limitations to our study include lack
of knowledge about consumers’ pre-experimental perceptions
about the labelled product’s climate characteristics and lack of data
on consumer characteristics and behaviour in different stores and
store types.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:
Section ‘Research design’ presents the experimental design,
Section ‘Estimation and data’ explains the econometric approach
and the data, Section ‘Results’ presents the results, and Section
‘Robustness’ describes the robustness of our findings. Finally,
concluding remarks are made in Section ‘Concluding remarks’.Research design
Experimental setting
The RCT was conducted in 17 Coop grocery stores that sell
climate-certified milk. Coop is a grocery retail group accounting
for approximately 20% of the Swedish grocery retail market (KF,
2012). The stores included in the trial vary significantly in size
and turnover because supermarkets, mid-size shops, and also
convenience stores are included. The stores are spread out over a
relatively large region around the city of Uppsala, including rural,
suburban and metropolitan areas throughout Uppsala and Stock-
holm Counties. Market shares are skewed: the descriptive statistics
in Table 1 show that the largest 20% of the stores in our sample are
supermarkets, and milk sales in these supermarkets amount to 80%
of all milk sales.
Our study focuses on the demand for unflavoured milk of the
brand Sju Gårdar (‘‘Seven Farms”), which is a local economic asso-
ciation for milk producers. Fluid, unflavoured milk is a suitable
choice of product when studying the demand effects of environ-
mental labelling because it is a relatively standardised commodity
with no significant differences in flavour or quality between
various brands (Kiesel and Villas-Boas, 2007).
Since 2010, the milk from Sju Gårdar has been certified accord-
ing to the Swedish standards for Climate Certification of Food
(CCF). The CCF is a voluntary labelling scheme that requires certi-
fied food producers to strive towards a significant reduction of
GHG emissions by focusing on the production choices with the lar-
gest climate impact (CCF, 2010). A requirement for accreditation to
a carbon label is that the producer already has another quality
certification.3 The milk from Sju Gårdar fulfils this requirement
because it is organically certified as well.
Most existing carbon labelling schemes provide consumers with
quantitative information about the amount of GHGs emitted dur-
ing the product’s life-cycle (see, e.g., Vandenbergh et al., 2011),
such as the British Carbon Reduction Label. Some schemes, how-
ever, only provide consumers with a logo that states that the pro-
duct is certified, thereby indicating that producers are committed
to make a particular effort to reduce GHG emissions from produc-
tion (Czarnezki, 2011). The Swedish CCF label applies the latter
approach. The treatment design builds on this specific labelling
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of store sample.
Share of stores (%) Sales of all milka (litres) Sales of climate milka (litres) Sales of organic milka (litres) Sales of convent. milka (litres)
Region
Rural 35.3 1795 161 52 1583
(770.6) (67.7) (39.2) (774.3)
Sub-urban 29.4 6026 794 277 4955
(4374.5) (649.3) (205.6) (3825.3)
Metropolitan 35.3 2475 341 146 1988
(1050.1) (154.3) (109.5) (1819.8)
Store size
Convenience store 23.5 1196 308 84 804
(194.6) (108.3) (56.4) (87.0)
Mid-size store 53.0 1906 256 90 1560
(704.9) (174.3) (66.6) (666.7)
Supermarket 23.5 8453 861 357 7235
(2597.5) (716.7) (196.3) (2046.2)
a The unit of the sales of milk presented is the average per week during the 4-week experimental period. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2
Factorial structure of treatment signs.
T0 T1
Logo-type Seven Farms Seven Farms
Product Milk Climate-certified milk
Implication of CCF – ‘‘We have committed to decrease
our climate impact”
Validity of CCF – URL to webpage with information
about the CCF standards
16 K. Elofsson et al. / Food Policy 58 (2016) 14–23scheme because the aim is to investigate the potential impact of a
voluntary labelling scheme.
Arguably, using a voluntary labelling scheme for a specific pro-
duct as a basis for the treatment, rather than a general carbon
labelling scheme, strengthens the external validity of the study.
The reason is that a general scheme, such as the one studied by
Vanclay et al. (2011), is not likely to be introduced on a wider scale
due to the large transaction costs associated with verification of
the products’ climate impact. Furthermore, Kortelainen et al.
(2013) highlight the importance of investigating carbon labels that
only convey qualitative information, due to the cognitive difficul-
ties for consumers to process complex quantitative information.Treatment and reference groups
The study uses a simple intervention to estimate how the
demand for climate-certified milk is influenced by the presence
of climate information. The intervention consists of two different
signs, in the format of 18  13 cm, attached to a shelf in close
proximity to Sju Gårdar’s medium-fat milk. The treatment sign
explains that Sju Gårdar’s milk is climate certified. The control sign
is identical, but without the climate-related information. This
procedure implies that the treatment effect captures the response
to environmental information per se rather than the reaction to
marketing signs (Carpenter et al., 1994). Hence, the treatment
impact measured in this study pertains to the addition of climate
information to a label. Throughout the remainder of this article,
we denote this as a carbon-labelling effect.4
The factorial structure of the two treatments, T0 (control) and
T1 (treatment), is displayed in Table 2. The treatment of interest,
T1, builds on the design of T0 but adds the information that the
milk from Sju Gårdar is climate certified. Images of the signs used
in the experiment can be found in Appendix (Fig. A1). Notably, the
information signs include a URL to a webpage that informs about
the CCF standards and validates the claim of certification.
The researchers instructed the stores’ personnel to alternate the
signs weekly, following a fully randomized scheme over a four-
week period. The random assignment of treatment weeks was
stratified to make sure that the treatments were balanced across
both weeks and stores, to achieve maximum precision in a regres-
sion with store and week fixed effects. The randomization scheme
is displayed in Appendix (Table A1). As observed, the treatment
assignments exhibit a bell-shaped distribution across stores (one4 The concept of a labelling effect differs somewhat between studies; sometimes,
the term refers to the effect of using a label compared to having no label at all.store was assigned four treatment weeks; four stores were
assigned three treatment weeks; seven stores had two treatment
weeks; four stores had one treatment week; and one store had zero
treatment weeks). By contrast, the treatments are uniformly dis-
tributed across weeks. This implies that there is enough variation
across space and time to permit time and fixed effects, while at
the same time making sure that the total number of treatment
weeks varies across stores.Estimation and data
The main aim of the study is to estimate an immediate
treatment effect on purchases of the climate-certified milk. We
hypothesise that this treatment effect is positive. There are two
supplementary hypotheses: the first supplementary hypothesis
regards the substitution effects, that is, how the treatment will
affect the demand for other milk brands, and the second supple-
mentary hypothesis regards dynamic effects, that is, the persis-
tence of the treatment effects. Given the nature of the studied
product, we expect to find a negative impact on demand for other
milk brands. Earlier studies indicate that the impact of information
on food demand can be relatively short-lived (Piggott and Marsh,
2004). However, our four-week panel can only be used to test for
dynamic effects in the very short-run. In spite of this limitation,
we hypothesise that the effect of information about climate certi-
fication will be short-lived even within the studied time frame.
The collected data represent a balanced panel consisting of
28 days (four weeks) across 17 stores, implying 476 day-store cells.
Our main hypothesis is tested using the following baseline
specification:
logðsalesitÞ ¼ b  treatmentit þa  logðturnoveritÞ þ h  xit þ di þ ct þ uit;
where salesit is the sales of climate-certified milk in store i at time t
in SEK. The variable treatmentit is a dummy that is equal to one if
the climate information was displayed in store i at time t and equal
Table 3
The impact of information on sales (log) of climate-certified milk.a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Baseline OLS
Treatment 0.0508 0.0633** 0.0652** 0.0674**
(0.0328) (0.0290) (0.0298) (0.0319)
R2 0.7746 0.8318 0.8464 0.8471
Autocorrb (p-value) 0.7846 0.1577 0.1183 0.2211
Panel B: Differential effects
Treatment  Small storec 0.0308 0.0154 0.0131 0.0138
(0.0293) (0.0267) (0.0284) (0.0290)
Treatment  Large storec 0.112** 0.122*** 0.124*** 0.129***
(0.0521) (0.0442) (0.0447) (0.0473)
R2 0.7758 0.8329 0.8475 0.8483
Autocorrb (p-value) 0.7587 0.1719 0.1366 0.2420
Panel C: Population-weighted regression d
Treatment 0.0672** 0.0791*** 0.0808*** 0.0817***
(0.0322) (0.0261) (0.0268) (0.0286)
R2 0.8133 0.8643 0.8825 0.8831
Store effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ctrl for turnover (log) No Yes Yes Yes
Day effects No No Yes Yes
Other controlse No No No Yes
Obs. 476 476 476 476
a Each panel-column represents a separate regression, based on daily data (17
stores; 28 days) observed from April 6 to May 3, 2013. Cluster-adjusted standard
errors in parenthesis, clustered at the treatment level (week-store). Dependent
variable is the log of the sales of climate-certified milk in SEK.
b The test for autocorrelation of the residual is based on Wooldridge (2002, pp.
282–283); xtserial with Stata (Drukker, 2003). The test is not defined for
population-weighted regressions.
c ‘‘Large store” is equal to one if the total number of customers during the
experiment is equal to or above the median; ‘‘small store” equals one if the total
number of customers is below the median.
d The population-weighted regression uses the current number of customers
(receipts) for each store and day as analytical weights.
K. Elofsson et al. / Food Policy 58 (2016) 14–23 17to zero otherwise. The coefficients di and ct capture store and time
fixed effects, respectively, and turnoverit is total store turnover at
time t and store i. The vector xit is a vector of exogenous controls:
the (logarithms of the) prices of the climate-certified milk item
(Sju Gårdar’s fat milk) and the closest substitute (Arla’s fat milk),5
and the number of customers; these controls will be used in comple-
mentary regressions but not in our preferred specification (see
below for a discussion of their potential endogeneity). The primary
purpose of the controls, including the fixed effects and the control
for turnover, is to reduce the unexplained variation in the dependent
variable and thereby improve precision. Finally, b captures the
impact on demand of being exposed to climate information. The
regressions are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
Daily scanner data are used for all sales. Our primary interest is
in the total sales of climate-certified milk, that is, the aggregate
sales of low-, medium- and high-fat milk. Altogether, the final
dataset includes 23 different fluid unflavoured milk products
(either low-, medium- or high-fat contents) with associated pur-
chases and prices. To ensure comparison of relatively homoge-
neous products, extra low- and extra high-fat milk, non-lactose
milk, non-dairy alternatives (e.g., soy and rice milk) and flavoured
milk were excluded from the final dataset.
Although treatments were alternated weekly, the baseline
regressions use daily data to exploit exogenous variation in turn-
over and the number of customers at the store-day-level, as well
as day-fixed effects. Standard errors take into account serial corre-
lation across days and are thus cluster-adjusted at the treatment
level (the store-week-level). The results from both unweighted
and weighted regressions are presented. The weighted regressions
adjust the estimates to cell population, that is, the number of cus-
tomers per day and store. Adjusting the estimates to be represen-
tative to the customer population provides a sense of the overall
market impact of the experiment, which is further discussed in
Section ‘Results’.e Other controls include log of the number of receipts and log of prices
(‘‘Sju Gårdar” and ‘‘Arla” fat milks).
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.Results
Baseline results: the impact of climate information on climate-certified
milk
The descriptive statistics of the key variables are displayed in
Appendix (Table A2). The baseline results are presented in Panel
A–C in Table 3. Our most parsimonious estimation, Model 1 in
Panel A, uses only store and week fixed effects and produces a
point estimate of 5% (p-value 0.125). This effect is statistically
insignificant at conventional levels. However, including a control
for daily turnover in the store increases the explained variation
from 0.77 to 0.83 and reduces the standard error of the treatment
effect. With this model, the impact of treatment is 6.33% and statis-
tically significant at the 5% level. Including day fixed effects and
other controls has only a limited impact on the point estimates
and the standard errors. The interpretation of the estimates is as
follows: stores treated with a climate information campaign
increased average daily sales of climate-certified milk by approxi-
mately 6%.
In Panel B in Table 3, we test for differential effects across store
size. In these regressions, the sample has been divided in half:
‘‘large stores” indicates that the store had more customers than
the median-sized store during the experiment. As seen, there is
considerable treatment heterogeneity: the treatment effects5 Prices were not observed directly but were calculated by dividing sales by
quantity sold for each milk product, store and day. This means that we do not observe
the price on days when the store had zero sales of the product, which is why we only
include the prices of fat milk, which is the product where we have the mos
observations with positive sales.tappear to be completely driven by the larger stores. The treatment
effect in larger stores is equal to 11–12%, which is statistically sig-
nificant irrespective of whether turnover is used as a control or not.
The point estimate for the smaller stores is 0.01 and is statisti-
cally insignificant.
The presence of treatment heterogeneity raises the issue of
whether the average treatment effects should be estimated using
population weights. As shown in Appendix (Table A1), the stores
differ in outreach: the largest fifth of the stores in our data repre-
sent approximately 80% of the total milk sales. The 12% effect
among the larger stores is thus representative for most of the
market for milk, which the estimates in Panel A in Table 3 do not
capture. When population weights are not used, b captures the
effect of carbon labelling on the average store’s milk sales, thus
treating small convenience stores as equally important as super-
markets. By contrast, if population weights are used, b captures
the effect of carbon labelling on the average customer’s demand
for milk. The estimates from the population-weighted regressions
are arguably the more relevant for environmental policy because
they capture the overall population effect on climate-certified milk
demand (see DuMouchel and Duncan, 1983 for a general discus-
sion of weights in the presence of treatment heterogeneity).
In the third panel, Panel C in Table 3, we therefore consider
weighted regressions in which the data are weighted by the num-
ber of customers. The number of customers can be seen as a proxy
for the population exposed to the information treatment. In this
Table 4











Treatment 0.0633** 0.0105 0.0304 0.00785
(0.0290) (0.00975) (0.0581) (0.00689)
R2 0.832 0.982 0.722 0.987
Population-weighted regressionsb
Treatment 0.0791*** 0.00148 0.0513 0.00157
(0.0261) (0.00831) (0.0481) (0.00654)
R2 0.864 0.988 0.749 0.991
Obs. 476 426 476 476
a Each cell in the table represents a separate regression, based on daily data (17
stores; 28 days) observed from April 6 to May 3, 2013. Cluster-adjusted standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the treatment level (week-store). Dependent
variable is the log of the sales of climate-certified milk and other varieties in SEK. All
regressions includes store and week fixed effects and a control for (the log of)
turnover. The regression models used in this table are identical to those used in
Table 3, Column 2, Panel A and C, except for the choice of dependent variable.
b The population-weighted regression uses the current number of customers
(receipts) for each store and day as analytical weights.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 5
Dynamic impacts of information on sales (log) of climate-certified milk.a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.0791*** 0.102*** 0.115*** 0.0835**
(0.0261) (0.0339) (0.0365) (0.0384)
Treatment (t  1) 0.0223 0.0405* 0.0348
(0.0244) (0.0218) (0.0369)
Treatment (t  2) 0.00767
(0.0267)
Treatment  Treatment (t  1) 0.0408
(0.0567)
Obs. 476 357 238 357
a Standard errors in parenthesis, cluster-adjusted at the treatment level (week-
store). Dependent variable is sales of climate-certified milk in SEK (log). All
regressions include week fixed effects, store fixed effects, and a control for turnover
(log). Regressions are population-weighted by the number of customers (receipts).
All lags correspond to weeks; treatment (t  1) thus represents an indicator variable
equal to one if the store had a treatment sign on display in the previous week, zero
otherwise. Model (1) includes no lags and is thus identical to the benchmark esti-
mate also found in, e.g., Table 3, Panel C, Column 2. In Model (2), the treatment
variable lagged one week is added; Model (3) adds a two-week lag of the treatment
variable; Model (4) considers an interaction effect between the current week’s
treatment status and that of the previous week.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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at the 1% level) and somewhat larger. It is intuitive that the
weighted estimates are larger than the baseline estimates in Panel
A because they give more weight to larger stores in which the
treatment effect is larger. The weighted estimates tell us that for
the average customer, the carbon labelling campaign increased
sales of climate-certified milk sold by approximately 6.8–8.0%.
Substitution effects
Because carbon labelling has a statistically significant effect on
sales of climate-certified milk, consumers must compensate by
reducing purchases of other goods, either other milk products,
other foods, or other consumption goods. This section studies the
impact of carbon labelling on the demand for other milk products
within the studied time period. The model specification is the same
as in Model 2 in Table 3 (Panels A and C), with week and store fixed
effects and the logarithm of turnover as controls, but the outcome
is now replaced with the logarithm of the sales of other milk products.
As observed in the last column of Table 4, the overall impact of
the intervention on sales of all milk products is negligible. The
weighted regressions (the second panel in Table 4) are precisely
estimated, and we can reject quantitatively low effects (approxi-
mately 1% effects; the point estimate is equal to 0.00265, and the
95% confidence interval, not reported in the table, is between
0.01 and 0.015). It is thus possible that consumers substitute
across milk products in such a way that the increase in the con-
sumption of climate-certified milk is largely offset by reductions
in other milk products. However, the sample is unfortunately too
small to estimate differential effects with high statistical power
for organic milk and conventional milk. Moreover, the baseline
estimate of 6–8% increase in purchases of the climate-certified
milk, presented in Table 3, is small enough to be compatible with
a less than 1% increase in total milk sales. It is thus not possible
to draw any conclusions on whether a carbon labelling campaign
promoting climate-certified milk primarily will work through a
reduction in other milk brands or through a reduction in other
products than milk.
Dynamic impacts
The results in the previous sections capture short-run, immedi-
ate responses to carbon labelling. This section addresses dynamic
impacts, that is, impacts of past treatments and their interaction
with current treatments. Both positive and negative intertemporal
effects are theoretically possible. Customers’ preferences might be
permanently affected by past treatments, but consumers might
also switch back to their past consumption behaviour once the
treatment week ends. Furthermore, customers could even react
in a compensatory manner, buying less carbon-labelled milk after
a treatment period than they would otherwise have done. Such
negative intertemporal effects might arise due to pure income
effects because carbon-labelled milk is more expensive but also
due to psychological mechanisms such as ‘‘moral licensing”
behaviour (Sachdeva et al., 2009).
Because treatment varied not only across stores but also across
time, it is possible to evaluate dynamic effects in a straightforward
manner. A first issue is the impact of lagged treatments on pur-
chases of climate-certified milk. The question is if the effect of a
treatment wears out rapidly over time or if it is more long-
lasting. A second issue concerns the impact of accumulated treat-
ments – that is, whether a prolonged exposure to treatment has
an additional effect over the current treatment.
The dynamic analysis uses the baseline, population-weighted
specifications with week and store fixed effects (i.e., the same spec-
ification as in Model 2, Panel C in Table 3). As observed in Table 5,there is limited evidence of significant dynamic effects. The lagged
treatments do not have an economically meaningful impact given
the current treatment (although the first lag is negative and statis-
tically significant at the 10% level in one of the models). This indi-
cates that the effects of climate information are not very persistent,
even in a short time perspective.
The interaction term included in Model 4 in Table 5 measures
the cumulative effect of treatment, that is, the effect of being trea-
ted with an information campaign in the current week, given that
treatment was also carried out the week before. Although the coef-
ficient is positive, in keeping with an increasing effect of exposure,
the interaction term is statistically insignificant.
Overall, the results in this subsection indicate that the effects of
carbon labelling are short-lived. However, given that the sample
size is gradually reduced when using lags, the lack of statistical
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conclusions regarding the magnitude of these effects.
Robustness
Apart from using a fixed-effects specification, no other statisti-
cal commitments were made prior to the experiment. The choice of
unit of analysis, the choice of dependent variable, and the choice of
controls were made by the authors ex post. In this section, we
therefore address the ex post research design choices made. To
assure research transparency, a variety of specifications and
robustness tests are presented together with the main results.
Using turnover as a control reduces the unexplained variation in
the dependent variable. However, a source of concern is whether
turnover is itself endogenous to treatment. It is theoretically possi-
ble that an information campaign attracts new customers to the
stores, which would make interpretation of the causal mechanism
more difficult. A similar story applies to the use of prices as con-
trols: it is possible that stores change the price of milk in response
to demand effects, which implies that prices are unsuitable as con-
trols. Fortunately, we find no effect of treatment on (the logarithm
of) total store turnover, the (logarithm of) the total number of
receipts or the (logarithm of) price of milk (see Table A3, Models
1–4). The causal effect thus appears to run chiefly through in-
store exposure to information. That prices remain invariant to
treatment is expected given that the experimental effect does not
seem to be large enough to affect the supply (there is no indication
that stores run out of climate-certified milk on treatment days; see
Table A3, Model 5). However, it must be emphasised that an
assumption of constant prices is not necessarily warranted if the
intervention is scaled up to a nation-wide campaign or policy,
which might have general equilibrium effects.
In all regressions, we have taken logarithms of sales as the
dependent variable. This eases interpretation and makes the
regression less vulnerable to extreme values in the dependent vari-
able. In Table A4, we re-estimate the baseline results but without
taking logs of the dependent variable. The table is identical to
Table 3, except the dependent variable and turnover are not
logged. The treatment effect on sales when using the weighted
regression is typically significant. Relating the size of the point
estimates to the average sales of 741.8 (Table A2), the weighted
estimate (Panel C of Table A4) is approximately 10%.
Table A5 considers the use of a lagged dependent variable in the
regressions. The structure in Table A5 is identical to the structure
in Table 3; the only difference is the inclusion of the lagged depen-
dent variable. Because daily data are used but the treatment is
changed on a weekly basis, the lagged dependent variable is
defined as the log of sales of climate-certified milk seven days prior
to the current observation. Notably, the inclusion of a lagged
dependent variable increases the point estimates of the treatment
effect compared to the baseline specification in Table 3, but the
overall directions of the estimates are the same: large and signifi-
cant for the larger stores and insignificant for the smaller stores.
Finally, we consider estimating the effects on the week-store
level, rather than the day-store level. So far, we have consistently
used daily data, allowing us to maximise precision by using time
and store-varying controls, and all standard errors have been
cluster-adjusted to take into account serial correlation of the error
term within weeks. A more conservative approach is to aggregate
the data and perform the estimation at the week-store level and
either cluster-adjust at the store level with fixed effects (see also
Hallstein and Villas-Boas, 2013) or to use first-differencing at the
week level. Because 17 clusters is at the lower end of the number
of groups necessary for cluster-adjusted standard errors to be con-
sistent (see Bertrand et al., 2004), first-differencing is an alternative
to fixed effects when the error term is serially correlated acrossweeks (if the error term follows a random walk, first-differencing
with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors yields consistent
standard errors). As indicated in Table A6, the effects are statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level when using weighted estimation
and significant at the 1% level when using first-differencing.
Concluding remarks
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether information
about a voluntary carbon labelling scheme affects the demand for
milk. By conducting a randomized controlled field trial in which
consumers are in a close-to-natural purchase situation, we mea-
sure the average demand response to the introduction of a carbon
label on climate-certified milk. The product information is manip-
ulated experimentally through an in-store information sign placed
on the shelf in close proximity to the climate friendlier milk. The
trial is carried out across a variety of geographical locations, hence
capturing a wide consumer group, which strengthens the general
validity of the results. The findings suggest that the information
sign has the potential to increase the demand for climate-
certified milk by approximately 6–8%. We find no dynamic effects
of labelling across time, which suggests that consumers’ response
to carbon labelling is short-lived.
Studies investigating the impact of eco-labelling on consumer
demand use a variety of approaches including different types of
product attributes considered in the labelling and differently
detailed information about these attributes. Applications are made
to products that vary with regard to price, price elasticity and the
availability of close substitutes. Different store types are included,
and experiments differ with regard to the degree of randomization
and the similarity of experimental and everyday shopping condi-
tions. To observe how this study adds to the understanding of
the impact of eco-labelling, these aspects need to be considered.
In our experiment, the label provides qualitative information on
the sustainability attribute of the product.We obtain a lower impact
on demand from labelling compared to most earlier experimental
studies that study a qualitative label (Hainmueller et al., 2015;
Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2012; Hallstein and Villas-Boas, 2013),
except for the study by Vanclay et al. (2011). Compared to studies
that provide quantitative information on the label, we obtain a
higher impact than Kortelainen et al. (2013), who use market data,
but smaller than Vlaeminck et al. (2014), where consumers are
aware of the fact that they are participating in an experiment.
The environmental attribute that we consider, climate impact, is
a pure public good type. In that regard, our study differs from, for
example, Hainmueller et al. (2015), where attributes with private
good characteristics, such as the taste of different coffee brands,
can be associated with the labelling. Economic theory predicts that
due to the free-riding effect, consumers are more likely to take into
account private good attributes, compared to public good
attributes, and consequently, demand responses can be expected
to differ. In practice, this can be complicated by the fact that con-
sumers tend to have subjective perceptions about the attributes
associated with a label (Janssen and Hamm, 2012; Wier et al.,
2008). Care should therefore be taken when re-interpreting results
from experimental studies such as ours in terms of the revealed
willingness to pay for reductions in GHG emissions.
With regard to food category, our study is close to Echeverría
et al. (2014) in which the stated preferences for carbon footprint
labelled milk are investigated. Whereas Echeverría et al. (2014)
obtain a high willingness-to-pay for carbon footprint-labelled milk,
we obtain a modest response in purchased quantity. On an intu-
itive level, this difference can be expected given earlier experience
from survey studies in which the stated support to a public good is
costless (Gadema and Oglethorpe, 2011; List and Gallet, 2001;
Murphy et al., 2005; Vermeir and Verbeke, 2006). However, the
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quantity demanded could also be related to the elasticities of
supply and demand.
In principle, the consumers’ budget constraint implies that
increased purchases of an eco-labelled product are likely to be fol-
lowed by reduced demand for other products. This matters for the
net environmental impact as well as for retailer profits. However,
in spite of the fact that we find no significant change in total milk
demand, we are not able to quantify substitution patterns with
certainty. A larger dataset would have probably facilitated the
identification of such patterns. It appears that other studies had
corresponding difficulties to measure substitution effects (see, for
example, Hallstein and Villas-Boas (2013) and Vanclay et al.
(2011)), but further research on the topic is likely to be valuable
given the importance of substitution effects for the overall envi-
ronmental impact of eco-labelling.
The treatment effect in our study is strongly related to store
type. We obtain a larger impact in large stores, which usually have
lower prices than small stores. This result contrasts with
Hainmueller and Hiscox (2012) and Tanner and Kast (2003), where
it is shown that environmentally friendly products are less
demanded in supermarkets and stores belonging to the lower price
segment. To better understand why the impact differs across store
types, further data on store and consumer characteristics would be
necessary. In addition, earlier studies indicate that the impact of
eco-labelling can differ between regions (Yu et al., 2014) and that
the pricing of eco-labels varies across retailer chains (Asche et al.,
2015). Hence, the impact of adding climate information could
potentially vary across regions and retailer chains, although we
are not able to analyse this given that our dataset is limited to a
single region and a single retailer chain.
Consumer trust in the overall eco-labelling scheme and con-
sumer beliefs about the environmental impact of food purchases
could also affect the demand impact of eco-labels (Cason and
Gangadharan, 2002; Janssen and Hamm, 2012; Röös and
Tjärnemo, 2011; Upham et al., 2011). Issues of trust and perceived
environmental impact might affect the outcome of our experiment
given the limited use of, and hence limited knowledge about, the
Swedish carbon label. Moreover, producer-driven labelling
schemes such as the one in this study usually convey the positive
properties of the more environmentally friendly product, whereasFig. A1. Control, T0 (to the left), anthe properties of the substitutes remain hidden. If consumers infer
that the non-labelled substitutes are less environmentally friendly
than the labelled goods, they are likely to choose the labelled
product, ceteris paribus. If, instead, they believe that there is a risk
that private labelling schemes overstate the environmental friend-
liness of the products, then they will be more reluctant to change
their purchase behaviour. Broader labelling schemes, which inform
about both good and bad products in a product group, such as the
schemes investigated by Hallstein and Villas-Boas (2013), Vanclay
et al. (2011) and Vlaeminck et al. (2014), are more likely to be
provided by governments, retail chains, or non-governmental
organizations. Such schemes are likely to be associated with
higher costs for their development and for measuring labelling
criteria. Also, mandatory eco-labelling schemes are not necessarily
seen as more trustworthy than private schemes. For example,
Janssen and Hamm (2014) show that the EU label for organic food
is less trusted among German consumers that alternative private
labels.
Finally, it is only efficient for producers, environmental organi-
zations and governments to spend efforts on improving environ-
mental performance and to develop environmental certification
schemes if eco-labelling actually changes consumer demand. Fur-
ther knowledge on the impact of carbon labelling on demand
and how it is related to label type, product, and location is there-
fore likely to be valuable to all of these actors in food markets.
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Appendix A
See Fig. A1.
See Tables A1–A6.d treatment, T1 (to the right).
Table A1
Distribution of treatment assignments.
Store Week
1 2 3 4 Total
CE GRÄNBY 1 0 1 0 2
CF BOLÄNDERNA 1 1 0 0 2
CF NORRTÄLJE 1 0 0 0 1
CF STENHAGEN GEM 1 0 1 1 3
CK HALLSTAVIK 1 0 0 1 2
CK RIMBO 0 1 0 0 1
CK RINGGATAN FTG 0 0 1 0 1
CK STORVRETA FTG 0 1 1 1 3
CK TORBJÖRNSGAT 0 1 1 1 3
CK UPPSALA 0 0 1 0 1
CK VÄSTERTORG 1 0 0 1 2
CK ÖREGRUND FTG 0 1 1 0 2
CK ÖSTHAMMAR 1 1 1 1 4
CN ALMUNGE FTG 0 1 1 1 3
CN EKEBY FTG 0 0 0 0 0
CN LILJEGATAN 1 0 0 1 2
CN SUNNERSTA FTG 1 0 1 0 2
Total 9 7 10 8 34
Table A2







Average sales per store (SEK)
Sju Gårdar 481.6 973.0 741.8
(244.3) (1114.9) (863.2)
All milk 1712.7 5831.5 3893.2
(409.1) (4172.1) (3675.9)
Organic milk 116.6 298.7 213.0
(109.9) (286.1) (239.2)
Conventional 1114.4 4559.8 2938.4
Milk (309.3) (3058.7) (2819.9)
Market shares in sample
Total sales, Sju Gårdar (SEK) 451,480 1,026,677 755,996
Total sales, all milk products (SEK) 1,661,651 6,325,180 4,130,578
Sales share, all milk products (%) 0.208 0.792 1
Sales share, Sju Gårdar (%) 0.305 0.695 1
N 8 9 17
Table A3
Impact of treatment on exogenous variables.a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Turnover (log) Customers (log) Price of Sju Gårdar’s fat milk (log) Price of Arla’s fat milk (log) Climate-certified milk products sold outb
Regular OLS
Treatment 0.0114 0.00885 0.0321 0.000786 0.0407
(0.0110) (0.00640) (0.0249) (0.00296) (0.0406)
Population-weighted regression
Treatment 0.0116 0.00911 0.0407 0.00346* 0.0340
(0.0105) (0.00782) (0.0420) (0.00205) (0.0368)
Obs. 476 476 476 476 476
a Cluster-adjusted standard errors in parenthesis (at the week-store level). All regressions include week fixed effects and store fixed effects. Dependent variable in column
header.
b ‘‘Climate-certified milk products sold out”, ranges from 0 to 3; 0 if all three products (low, medium-fat and fat milk) from Sju Gårdar were in stock; 3 if all products were
missing.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table A4
Baseline result, with sales in SEK as the dependent variable.a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Baseline OLS
Treatment 15.48 30.68* 32.34* 31.61*
(18.64) (15.91) (16.41) (17.71)
R2 0.8349 0.9155 0.9283 0.9284
Autocorrb (p-value) 0.0653 0.1645 0.1642 0.1513
Panel B: Differential effects
Treatment  Small storec 5.288 2.078 2.882 0.802
(15.87) (15.57) (16.19) (16.45)
Treatment  Large storec 31.03 52.11** 54.42** 54.99**
(29.41) (24.12) (24.81) (26.50)
R2 0.8350 0.9157 0.9284 0.9285
Autocorrb (p-value) 0.0650 0.1622 0.1607 0.1493
Panel C: Population-weighted regressiond
Treatment 48.72 74.26** 75.99** 76.46**
(36.14) (33.49) (32.72) (34.90)
R2 0.8356 0.9193 0.9429 0.9430
Store effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ctrl for turnover No Yes Yes Yes
Day effects No No Yes Yes
Other controlse No No No Yes
Obs. 476 476 476 476
a This table has an identical structure to Table 3; the difference is that the
dependent variable is measured in sales in SEK rather than the logarithm of sales
and that turnover, rather than log(turnover), is used as control variable. Each panel-
column represents a separate regression, based on daily data (17 stores; 28 days)
observed from April 6 to May 3, 2013. Cluster-adjusted standard errors in paren-
thesis, clustered at the treatment level (week-store).
b The test of autocorrelation of the residual is based on Wooldridge (2002, pp.
282–283); xtserial with Stata (Drukker, 2003). The test is not defined for
population-weighted regressions.
c ‘‘Large store” is equal to one if the total number of customers during the
experiment is equal to or above the median; ‘‘small store” equals one if the total
number of customers is below the median.
d The population-weighted regression uses the current number of customers
(receipts) for each store and day as analytical weights.
e Controls include log of receipts and log of prices (‘‘Sju Gårdar” and ‘‘Arla” fat
milks).
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Table A5
Baseline result (Table 3) when including a lagged dependent variable in all
regressions.a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Baseline OLS
Treatment 0.0559 0.0677** 0.0695** 0.0723**
(0.0347) (0.0290) (0.0299) (0.0318)
R2 0.7787 0.8329 0.8478 0.8484
Autocorrb (p-value) 0.9715 0.1679 0.1331 0.2498
Panel B: Differential effects
Treatment  Small storec 0.00674 0.00674 0.00398 0.00307
(0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0281) (0.0289)
Treatment  Large storec 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.125***
(0.0431) (0.0431) (0.0433) (0.0456)
R2 0.8338 0.8338 0.8487 0.8493
Autocorrb (p-value) 0.9408 0.1820 0.1523 0.2714
Panel C: Population-weighted regressiond
Treatment 0.0733** 0.0811*** 0.0822*** 0.0833***
(0.0347) (0.0260) (0.0265) (0.0280)
R2 0.8186 0.8643 0.8829 0.8834
Store effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ctrl for turnover (log) No Yes Yes Yes
Day effects No No Yes Yes
Other controlse No No No Yes
Store effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
a This table has an identical structure to Table 3; the difference is that the models
presented here include a lagged dependent variable in all regression models. Each
panel-column represents a separate regression, based on daily data (17 stores;
28 days) observed from April 6 to May 3, 2013. Cluster-adjusted standard errors in
parenthesis, clustered at the treatment level (week-store). The dependent variable
is sales of climate-certified milk in SEK (log); the lagged dependent variable is the
same variable observed one week before the actual treatment day.
b The test of autocorrelation of the residual is based on Wooldridge (2002, pp.
282–283); xtserial with Stata (Drukker, 2003). The test is not defined for
population-weighted regressions.
c ‘‘Large store” is equal to one if the total number of customers during the
experiment is equal to or above the median; ‘‘small store” equals one if the total
number of customers is below the median.
d The population-weighted regression uses the current number of customers
(receipts) for each store and day as analytical weights.
e Controls include log of receipts and log of prices (‘‘Sju Gårdar” and ‘‘Arla” fat
milks).
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table A6
Estimates for weekly aggregated dataa.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed effects First-differencing
Treatment 0.0623* 0.0812** 0.0726** 0.0944***
(0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0343) (0.0342)
Weighted regression No Yes No Yes
Obs. 68 68 51 51
a Cluster-adjusted standard errors in parenthesis (at the store level) for the fixed
effects regression; robust to heteroscedasticity when using first-differencing. All
regressions include week fixed effects and store fixed effects. Dependent variable in
column header. The specification used is the same as in Table 3, Model 1.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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